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INTRODUCTION
These comments address two of the primary  competition issues identi-
fied by the organizers  of this workshop  and the authors  of papers on competi-
tion in  NAFTA markets:
* whether the  elimination  of trade barriers  reduces market  concentra-
tion; and
* whether  special  competition  rules  are  or should  be applied  to the
agriculture  or agribusiness  industries.
These issues are  addressed from  the perspective  of U.S.  antitrust law enforce-
ment.  The  comments  reflect my personal  views,  and not  necessarily those  of
the U.S.  Justice  Department.
NAFTA'S  EFFECT  ON  MARKET  CONCENTRATION
When U.S. antitrust authorities analyze the competitive effects of hori-
zontal  mergers,  they attempt to determine  whether the transaction is likely to
create  or enhance  market power  or to facilitate its exercise  in the product and
geographic  markets  in which  the merging  firms compete.  Guidelines for this
analysis  are found  in:  U.S. Department  of Justice/Federal Trade Commission,
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (the  "Guidelines"), § 1.0.1  The  relevant  geo-
graphic  market is defined  as a geographic  region  in which  a hypothetical  mo-
nopolist could  profitably  impose  a  small  but  significant,  non-transitory  price
increase.  In most cases,  a 5 percent price increase will be considered small but
significant.  (Id.,  §§  1.11,  1.21).
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When a Free Trade Agreement  (FTA) eliminates customs duties, quo-
tas or other trade barriers, it often expands the relevant geographic  market.  To
illustrate  this point,  assume that:  (a) U.S.  and Mexican  firms sell  a particular
product  in their  domestic  markets  for approximately  the  same  price;  (b)  the
United  States  imposed  a  10  percent  duty  on  imports of that  product  before
NAFTA:  and (c)  the United  States eliminated duties on imports  from Mexico
upon NAFTA's implementation.  Before NAFTA, the relevant geographic  mar-
ket might encompass  all of the United  States (with  say  six firms in that mar-
ket).  Even though there were,  say, four Mexican producers located just south
of the  U.S. border in this hypothetical  example, the relevant market would ex-
clude  Mexico  if the addition of a  10 percent  duty to the cost of imports  from
Mexico  would make  it impractical  for consumers  to switch to any of the four
Mexican  producers  in  order to  avoid the  U.S.  producer's  5 percent  price  in-
crease. (Guidelines, § 1.2).
Continuing with  this example,  if NAFTA  eliminated the U.S.  10 per-
cent customs duty, it might become feasible for U.S. consumers to switch to the
Mexican producers in order to avoid the U.S. producer's  5 percent increase.  If
enough consumers were likely to switch to the Mexican producers to make the
5 percent price increase unprofitable,  the relevant geographic  market would be
expanded  to include the  region in Mexico  where the four Mexican producers
were located.
The expansion of geographic markets,  however,  does not always result
in market de-concentration.  To illustrate this point, again assume that NAFTA
eliminated the  10 percent customs duty.  If all of the Mexican firms were inde-
pendently owned, the number of firms in the relevant geographic  market would
increase  from  six  to ten,  and the  relevant  geographic  market  would  be less
concentrated  after NAFTA.  But, if some of the U.S.  producers owned or con-
trolled some of the Mexican producers,  the larger post-NAFTA  U.S./Mexican
geographic  market could be more  concentrated  than  the smaller pre-NAFTA
U.S.  geographic  market.
As a note of caution,  governments  that have  the power  to expand  rel-
evant geographic  markets by adopting FTA's usually retain the power to subse-
quently contract those  geographic  markets.  For example,  NAFTA authorizes
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member countries to exclude or limit imports by imposing  antidumping duties,
countervailing  duties  and other forms of import  trade  relief.  NAFTA also  in-
cludes  "snap  back" provisions  that reimpose duties or quotas  if there is a sud-
den surge  of imports.  And, currency fluctuations that occur after the adoption
of an FTA can  offset the elimination  of customs duties.
RULES  FOR ANALYZING  COMPETITIVE  EFFECTS  OF  AGRIBUSI-
NESS  MERGERS
The  Guidelines apply  a  common  framework  for  analyzing  the  com-
petitive  effects  of mergers in  all  industries.  In  one sense,  however,  there  are
special  rules  for agriculture  and agribusiness,  because  the  application  of this
analytical  framework  requires  an  investigation  into  the  specific  competitive
conditions  in  the  industry  in  which  the  merging  firms  compete.  Despite  the
specific nature of each merger investigation,  it is possible to sketch some broad
generalizations  about merger investigations  in the agriculture and agribusiness
industry. First, although concentration at the farm level continues to increase as
the  number  of U.S.  farms  decreases,  farming  tends  to be  an unconcentrated
industry.  It is unlikely  that the U.S. competition  authorities will challenge  one
farmer's purchase of acreage  from  his neighbor.
Second,  the Department of Justice is concerned  about mergers  among
firms that sell inputs to farmers  that may create,  enhance  or facilitate the exer-
cise of monopoly or oligopoly market power.  Recent investigations under Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act include:
* Monsanto's  acquisition  of DeKalb Genetics  corporation  (which re-
sulted  in  Monsanto's  agreement  to  spin  off important  rights  to
agrobacterium-mediated  transformation  technology  and to  license
its Holden's  corn germplasm  rights, as
the price for avoiding  a challenge  in court);
* the New Holland/Case  merger (which resulted in divestitures of New
Holland's four-wheel drive and two-wheel drive tractor business and
Case's hay  tool business);  and
* Monsanto's proposed acquisition  of Delta & Pine Land's cottonseed
business  (which resulted in the parties'  abandonment of the transac-
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The Department of Justice is also concerned about mergers among firms
that buy products  from farmers.  Under the Guidelines, market power includes
monopsony  or oligopsony  power-  - the power  to depress the price paid  for a
product below the competitive price. (Id., § 0.1).  Farmers, in particular,  may be
vulnerable  to the  exercise  of monopsony  power,  because  the  relatively  high
cost of trucking  their crops to distributors  or processors  in comparison to the
value of crops often means  that it will not be feasible to ship them very far past
the closest  buyer's  facilities  in  order  to get  a better  price.  As  noted  in  the
MacDonald paper, the Department's actions in the Cargill/Continental  transac-
tion  provide  a useful  insight  into our  analysis  of concentration  in the  grain
distribution business.  After evaluating numerous local  geographic markets  in
which the transaction  might have created,  enhanced  or facilitated  the exercise
of monopsony power,  we required divestitures  of Cargill or Continental facili-
ties  in all  of the  approximately  twelve  local  markets  in which we  concluded
that the transaction might create this type of market power.2
The  adoption of an  FTA can  affect our  monopsony  analysis  in some
cases.  For example,  if NAFTA made it feasible for farmers in northern Mon-
tana  to sell  their  crops to  nearby  Canadian  grain  distribution  companies,  as
well as nearby  U.S. firms,  the relevant geographic  market would be expanded
to include  those  Canadian buyers.  As with the previous monopoly  power ex-
ample,  the  adoption  of NAFTA  could, but  would  not  necessarily,  ameliorate
monopsony  concerns  by reducing  concentration  in the  relevant  geographic
market.  On the other hand, if NAFTA eliminated  all Canadian duties and quo-
tas, but its sanitary regulations precluded U.S. farmers from selling their crops
to Canadian grain distributors, we would exclude those firms from the relevant
geographic  market,  no matter how close they might be to the U.S.  farmer.
2The Antitrust Division's website  (http://www.usdoj.gov)  includes  pleadings, briefs,
press releases  and other public documents for recent merger investigations and court
cases.  Documents  such as Competitive Impact Statements  and Responses to Public
Comments  often provide useful summaries  of our legal and economic  analysis.
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